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Detecting Malicious DNS Queries Over Encrypted Tunnels Using Statistical
Analysis and Bi-Directional Recurrent Neural Networks
Abstract
The exponential rise in the number of malicious threats targeting computer networks and digital services
puts network infrastructure in jeopardy. Domain name protocol attacks are one of the most pervasive
network attacks posing a threat to networks, whereby attackers send harmful information to the network;
this type of threat is identified as DNS tunneling. The DNS protocol has recently gained increased
attention from cyber-attackers, targeting organizations with a web presence or reliance on e-commerce
businesses. Cyber-attackers can subtly exploit the contents of encrypted DNS packets that are sent
across covert network tunnels, which are difficult for firewalls and blacklist detection methods to detect.
Therefore, efficient methods for detecting DNS intrusions in the network are required. Machine learning
(ML), deep learning (DL), and computational intelligence models have proved to be increasingly effective
in dealing with these cyber-attacks, especially when using an appropriate dataset. This paper proposes an
intrusion detection model to detect malicious DNS over HTTPS (DoH) queries among network covert
tunnels, using statistical analysis and Bi-directional Recurrent Neural Network (BRNN) techniques, based
on the flow level of the network traffic. The proposed approach was tested and evaluated based on a
realistic dataset called CIRA-CIC-DoHBrw-2020, provided by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity.
Experiments have shown that the robustness of the model is strong, with a detection rate of 100%.
Furthermore, the proposed model achieved high performance in terms of the accuracy rate in detecting
malicious DoH queries, with low false-negative and false-positive rates. Furthermore, the number of
features used is fewer than other approaches, making it perform faster in the training and testing phases.
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1. Introduction
DNS protocol has been the core of the Internet
infrastructure since 1985. It is a query-response protocol to help users reach host servers by resolving
hostnames and corresponding IP addresses Bilge et al.
[1]. DNS provides services through the Internet
depending on domain names and their IP addresses,
such as email services, load balancing, and distribution
networks, etc. Torabi et al. [2]. DNS traffic flows
unencrypted through the organization's network, which
enables the organization's administrators to monitor
how insiders browse websites and broadcast media
consumption, and monitor network traffic against any
malicious activities Ashi et al. [3]. This seems beneficial, but at the same time it is against the principle of
protecting user privacy, which is always an essential
consideration. Additionally, transmitting unencrypted
traffic is a vulnerability that can be exploited by cyberattackers, compromising the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of such data.
Popularizing protocols to encrypt DNS traffic is the
best solution to improve the confidentiality and integrity of user privacy. Such protocols include DNS over
HTTPS (DoH) and DNS-over-TLS (DoT), which are
double-edged swords; while they protect user privacy,
they create challenges for organizations trying to protect their environments from outsider malware or malicious insiders Stevanovic et al. [4]. These protocols
have made monitoring the network traffic more complex, and have facilitated the malicious activities of
attackers by hiding their malicious malware within
DoH queries, to impose dominance on command-andcontrol servers and thereby launch attacks Stevanovic
et al. [4].
The “IDC 2020 Global DNS Threat Report”
announced that in 2020 DNS attacks were launched
against 83% of the Internet service providers, and 79%
of all telecommunications providers, affecting the
availability of their services and causing losses of over
USD 5 million in losses.
The more creative cyber attackers become, the more
efforts researchers in the field must undertake. In
recent times, detecting DNS attacks has become the
primary focus of many researchers, and awareness has
increased that the traditional blacklisted intrusion
detection methods are no longer working effectively.
Although blacklisted systems have low false detection
alarms, they are unable to detect zero-day attacks Jafar

et al. [5]. Furthermore, keeping them up-to-date with
the evolution of DNS attacks is incredibly expensive
Satoh et al. [6].
Therefore, increasing attention has been redirected
towards careful network traffic analysis, to improve
accuracy and effectiveness in distinguishing between
malicious and benign DoH queries Almashhadani et al.
[7]. Related approaches extract the intelligence of Big
Data, computational intelligence, and ML technologies, all of which can build Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that provide organizational capabilities to
monitor networks and prevent violations of user privacy Torabi et al. [2]. Moreover, researchers have
attempted to provide more development by looking for
new trends, including adding a preprocessing layer to
extract the most significant features in the dataset, and
combining multiple classifiers to improve performance
Kailas et al. [8].
Despite that, IDS to detect malicious DoH queries
based on conventional ML and Big Data technologies
has challenging issues, like processing large volumes
of network traffic promptly and accurately, and the
ability to generalize training predictions for new and
different types of attacks Yang et al. [9].
With the revolutionary growth of computational
power, DL techniques have demonstrated remarkable
progress and have been able to overcome many challenges and limitations Roy and Cheung [10]. DL
neural networks - such as Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
- have delivered progress in a wide range of applications, including self-driving vehicles, voice/image
recognition, and traffic prediction Rusk [11]. Moreover, new algorithms recently introduced for CNN and
RNN can extract a sequential connection between
features, to solve more difficult issues that were
traditionally addressed by less efficient conventional
methods Sherstinsky [12].
Additionally, the importance of statistical feature
analysis cannot be overlooked, as it has been observed
experimentally that these features can analyze network
traffic flow while removing any redundant information,
thereby providing an effective classification of benign
and malicious DoH queries Moustafa et al. [13].
These accumulated challenges and the available
new DL trends highlight the motivation for this paper,
which proposes an IDS model to detect malicious DoH
queries in covert tunnels by conducting statistical
analysis on the network traffic flow level using BRNN
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model. This paper looks for answers to the research
question of how IDS model performance can be
enhanced in terms of accuracy and error rates.
This paper evaluates the performance of the BRNN
model based on the accuracy and error rates to build
IDS. For future work, we aim to optimize the model to
be implemented in real-time as Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS) to prevent any malicious DoH queries
within an organizational network.
This paper's structure is as follows: Section 2 reviews previous work in this area, while some background information is explained in Section 3. Section 4
explains the CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 dataset, and
the methodology is described in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Literature review
The misuse of DoH queries poses an escalating
threat to the Internet's infrastructure by paving the way
for attackers to launch their attacks. A variety of IDS
have been implemented over the past decade to eliminate this threat, depending on the trend of ML, DL,
and data mining technologies. In order to achieve the
desired goals, researchers are trying to maintain the
highest accuracy rates in detecting malicious DoH
queries. Therefore, researchers have increasingly
focused on improving the performance of supervised
and unsupervised ML techniques by increasing interest
in manipulating the dataset, trying to optimize features'
dimensions, and selecting the most appropriate solutions to achieve the desired outcomes. To categorize
these features, four groups can be used:
1. Relational: relational features are related to predefined malware, predefined malicious IP addresses, and zone/location of the malicious domain
names and IP addresses. Defining the relation
provides intuition to classify and cluster the potential malicious IP addresses and domain names
Torabi et al. [2].
2. Statistical: statistical features are calculated by
performing statistical data analysis to distinguish
between malicious and benign network traffic
without any redundant information Moustafa et al.
[13]. These include analyzing the frequencies of
the packets in particular network traffic or
analyzing the TTL values related to domain activity to identify that domain Torabi et al. [2].
3. Text-based: text-based features can identify the
domain name according to its meaning, the
randomness degree of its alphabets, and alphabets'
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similarities. These features are useful to identify
patterns of malicious domain names which are
generated automatically by a Domain Name
Generating Algorithm (DGA) Almashhadani et al.
[7].
4. Time-series: time-series features represent the nature of the network traffic, in which TLS protocol
encrypts the traffic in a series of packets flowing in
a time-periodic manner Montazeri Shatoori et al.
[14]. This provides the ability to monitor packets'
behavior during a period of time and detect
anomalous behavior. An example of a time-series
feature is request/response time Al-Fawa'reh and
Al-Fayoumiy [15].
Numerous DNS intrusion detections techniques
have been explored in the literature in relation to these
feature types. Almashhadani et al. [16] called their
detection system “MaldomDetector”, to detect communications to Command and Control (C&C) servers
using malicious DGA-based domain names. The
“MaldomDetector” system used the RMA algorithm to
select text-based features responsible to determine if
there is a random relationship between the characters
of the tested domain names in the “DGArchive”
dataset. They relied on the randomness of characters,
as attackers used random algorithms to generate malicious domain names. They trained and evaluate their
detection system with Decision Tree (DT), Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Ensemble, Naïve Bayes (NB),
and K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) (k ¼ 5) classifiers.
“MaldomDetector” achieved 98% accuracy rate in
detecting malicious domain names by depending on
the relation between the name characters.
Satoh et al. [6] built their blacklist-based approach
to detect the malicious DNS queries by classifying
them according to their causes. They noted that administrators cannot rely on ordinary blacklist-based
approaches, as their results are mostly unreliable. Their
detection approach depended on numerical analysis of
benign DNS queries before and after malicious queries,
to estimate their causes. Using the blacklist concept to
reduce the number of investigated malicious queries,
they utilized ML techniques to consistently update
their dependent blacklists and increase the reliability of
results for the benefit of administrators.
To improve the detection capability of this method,
several studies have attempted to automatically update
blacklist entries by using ML techniques. They have
adopted Word2Vec and several Gaussian ML models
for the numerical analyses of 388 entries in their
blacklist.
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Nguyen et al. [17] suggested a new approach to
detect malicious DNS queries, combining two unsupervised ML algorithms: “Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications of Noise Clustering”
(DBSC) and K-NN. Their approach was based on
behavioral analysis of DNS queries, such as the number of exchanged bytes and the time series of the sent
messages. They achieved 100% detection accuracy
rate, and a 98% ROC-AUC score.
Liu and Gou [18] proposed a DNS detection model
depending on load-based and traffic statistical analysis
of DNS tunnels to extract the most significant features.
For classification, they used the Random Forest (RF)
classifier. For evaluation, they used the ROC-AUC
score, and they obtained average accuracy of 99.6%.
The efficiency of IDS is enhanced when appropriate
datasets and corresponding ML techniques are employed.
However, researchers continually attempt to provide
ever-more improved solutions. Recently, many studies
have incorporated additional processing for dataset features to improve their act during ML model training.
Al Messabi et al. [19] suggested an approach based
on the behavioral analysis of suspicious DNS, with
marking prior to user visits. Depending on the previous
approaches that they had studied, they chose text-based
features such as the number of characters, dots, digits,
and hyphens in the domain name, the order of the
words, and other textual characteristics. They then
sorted these features according to their rank rate (using
the WEKA tool), and excluded all with a low-ranking
rate. They collected their data from malicious malware
websites, Google search engines, and Alexa. Their
model was trained by the Decision Tree classifier, and
achieved 77.52% accuracy.
Almashhadani et al. [7] discussed new cyber-attacks
in which attackers target business infrastructures for
extortion. One of these attacks attempts to encrypt the
victims’ data and block their computers, utilizing C&C
communication protocols such as DNS, HTTP, and
NBNS, to inject their encryption public key. The researchers followed a methodology to analyze the
network traffic in both packet and flow levels using the
“MCFP” dataset, and built their IDS using independent
classifiers. While analyzing the DNS traffic, they found
that informative features can be extracted by error
statistics in domain names, as well as by differences
between illegitimate and legitimate traffic time.
Behavioral features can be extracted from a number of
DNS queries for meaningless domain names,
employing Shannon Entropy metrics, programmerdefined Python functions, and Weka tools. All extracted features were used to train two classifiers, one

based on packet level and the other on flow level. Both
classifiers built two accurate IDS, with accuracy rates
of 97.92% and 97.08%, respectively.
Alsaadi et al. [20] built IDS by implementing Ant
Colony Optimization (ACO) and Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) algorithms to extract features, and
three classification algorithms: K-NN, SVM, and NB.
Their datasets were KDD cup and NSL-KDD, which
contain several network attacks collected at the packet
level, such as Denial of Service, Probe, User to Root,
and Remote to Local. The accuracy rate achieved by
the K-NN to detect those attacks in both datasets on
average was 99.53%, while the NB achieved 91%, and
SVM achieved 85.6%.
Damodaram [21] proposed a framework to identify
malicious botnets according to their DNS queries.
They used a genetic algorithm to extract the appropriate features and hyper-parameters as a pre-processing step for the TI-2016 DNS dataset. RF was used to
train the framework, which achieved 94.71% accuracy.
Many other researchers have adopted DL techniques to seek further improvement in the IDS domain.
DL implements the ML process using a hierarchal
artificial neural network (NN), including CNN and
RNN. The main characteristic of such techniques is
generalization, and the ability to recognize new patterns of malicious NN traffic on which the model was
not trained Lecun [22].
The IDS model presented by Fawcett [23] identified
malicious network traffic using one class dataset,
whereby the whole dataset had only normal traffic data to
avoid manual labeling. They used CNN and support
vectors (SV) as unsupervised DL techniques and evaluated their IDS model by comparing the CNN and SV
performance, finding that SV had the highest accuracy
rate of 96% in detecting malicious network traffic.
Kwon et al. [24], introduced an IDS model for an
“IEEE based power system network” using BRNN.
They analyzed the network traffic of the IEEE cyberphysical system and separated the header and payload
for each packet. The BRNN-model training phase was
performed. First, they used the packet header data to
learn the pattern of the NN communication flow, then
they used the packet payload to validate the power
system data and detect anomalies. The proposed model
could fully detect advanced power system attacks by
unauthorized commands and identify NN communication problems.
Yuan et al. [25] proposed an approach to detect
DDoS attacks in network traffic using the BRNN
technique. In the data preprocessing phase, they
extracted text, Boolean, and numerical features. In the
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experiment, they implemented one conventional ML
technique, RF, and many DL techniques, including
CNN and the BRNN with different window sizes.
Comparative evaluation between all the implemented
techniques revealed that BRNN outperformed all other
techniques in terms of generalization and error rate
reduction, with an accuracy rate of 98.410%.
Bouzar-Benlabiod et al. [26] built a model to detect
NN attacks using Principle Component Analysis
(PCA) for feature dimensionality reduction, and
LSTM-RNN for training the model. After the evaluation, the achieved accuracy rate was 98.85%, with a
low FP rate (4.86%).
Wang et al. [27] attempted to provide enhanced algorithms for building efficient IDS by optimizing the
“single-layer hidden forward neural network” and
“extreme machine learning” algorithms, to increase
learning speed and performance efficiency in classification models. They proposed a “self-adaptive extreme
learning machine (SaELM)” algorithm, which adapts itself automatically by selecting the adequate number of
neurons in the hidden layer to build the optimal neural
network. To evaluate the proposed SaELM they
compared its performance against the Italian wine and
Iris classification problems, with the performance of BP,
ELM, and “general regression neural network (GRNN)”
algorithms. SaELM was effective in speed training and
automatically finding the optimal number of neurons
without adjusting the weight in the training phase.
Cui et al. [28] built their malware detection
approach based on an innovative method by utilizing
the ability of deep learning in image recognition. They
stated that malware code poses serious threats against
Internet infrastructure, entailing significant risks in IoT
and mobility devices. Their approach, based on image
visualization techniques, converted malware codes into
greyscale images to extract features automatically.
CNN is advantageous in such situations as its structure
reduces neural network complexity, especially with
greyscale images as multidimensional input. They used
CNN to extract the malware images features and
classify them. They obtained 25 types of malwares
represented by 9342 greyscale images for their dataset.
They used a bat resampling algorithm to overcome
imbalanced data and achieve higher accuracy rates.
Comparing their experimental results with those of
previous relevant researches, they achieved a higher
accuracy rate of 94.5%, a precision score of 94.6%,
and a recall score of 94.5%. Despite the promising
results, the CNN algorithm is only used with fixed-size
images, and this was a limitation of the proposed
approach.
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In 1980 a mathematical and analytical method
called the wavelet transformation theory was proposed.
Wavelet transformation theory proves the ability in
time domain localization and focal features. Wavelet
Neural network (WNN) combines the advantages of
the wavelet algorithm and the robustness of the neural
networks to solve classification problems, but it is
hampered in finding a suitable activation function.
Wang et al. [29] proposed a threat assessment model,
considering it the mainstay to prevent cooperation attacks. They developed an algorithm that can be leveraged to determine the optimal activation function of
the WNN, which they called “Multiple Wavelet
Function Wavelet Neural Networks”. The results
showed that “Morlet” is the optimal activation function
that outfits the proposed problem.
“Probabilistic Neural Network PNN” was used by Yi
et al. [30] to diagnose faults in the mechanical equipment.
Their contribution was derived from striving to exploring
more models with accurate and real-time predictions at
low computational costs. They proposed a self-adaptive
PNN (SaPNN), which automatically supplied the original
PNN with the most suitable parameters. To prove the
performance of SaPNN when implemented with a fault
detection problem, it was compared to the performance of
BP, ELM, GRNN, and SaELM algorithms. Experimental
results proved that SaPNN achieved higher accuracy rates
with lower computational costs and better generalization.
3. Background
A. IDS vs. Prevention Systems
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA)
constitute the security objectives triangle in any
network, and any measure to penetrate this triangle is
called an intrusion, such as viruses, worms, and attacks. Network intrusions are a primary concern for
cyber defenders, who are always trying to create systems to detect and prevent these intrusions Ashoor and
Gore [31], as explored in this research. IDS identifies
intrusions by monitoring network traffic, preserving
network logs, and reporting intrusions to the network
administrator IDS. IDS copies network traffic for readonly analysis to detect any intrusions that have already
been launched, and notify the administrators about
what is going on so they can apply manual interventions. IDS is implemented outbound of the
network line without affecting the network data flow
Ashoor and Gore [32].
IDS plays a critical role in network security, but
after-occur responses and the manual interactions
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delays, which range from a few seconds to minutes
Ashoor and Gore [32], may enable intrusion attacks to
succeed. With the increasing development of network
intrusions, a small worm can exploit a vulnerable
server within 30 s Ashoor and Gore [31].
Therefore, IPS automates responses to detected intrusions to prevent them before any negative consequences, by blocking, dropping, or terminating their
network traffic Wu et al. [33]. To do this, IPS is
implemented within the network line (as shown in
Fig. 1), so high processing and storage capabilities are
required to cope with the high network traffic volume
without any delay Ashoor and Gore [31].
B. DNS Protocol Potential Risks
DNS infrastructure is a popular target for cyber-attacks, targeting organizations that have a web presence
or which rely on e-commerce. Attackers can abuse
DNS infrastructure to collect users’ identifying credentials, such as IDs and passwords. For example,
DDoS attacks against DNS servers can be executed by
numerous compromised devices (as in botnet attacks),
to overwhelm these servers with bogus queries until
they become unable to respond to legitimate queries
Hassan [34].
Two main techniques help to constitute sophisticated DNS attacks:
 IP-Flux/Fast-Flux Technique
Repeatedly random and short time-to-live (TTL)
IP addresses are assigned to a specific domain
name by “Domain Change Algorithm” Stevanovic
et al. [4]. Every 3 min, the DNS server can
generate a different IP address for a specific
domain name to ensure service continuity, and to
support more traffic volume for that domain name
Cochran and Cannady [35]. Attackers abuse the IPFlux technique to distribute their attacks across the
wide networks, including DDOS, phishing, data
theft, and other attacks Stevanovic et al. [4]. Taking

Fig. 1. Intrusion Detection System vs. Intrusion Prevention System.

advantage of changeable and short TLL IP addresses, attackers can avoid any IDS and hide the
existence of their malicious servers Torabi et al.
[2]. An attacker can create a hidden layer between
the compromised user and the desired web server.
In normal situations, the user gets the IP address
in response to a DNS query for the requested
website, but when an attacker appears in the middle, the user will get an IP address for a malicious
website Cochran and Cannady [35]. For example,
when a user sends a DNS query requesting the IP
address of his bank website to a compromised DNS
server, he will get back an IP address of a malicious website, which looks exactly like the bank
web site. When the user enters his user's name and
password, he gets an error message and an instruction to try again; for the retry, the malicious
site redirects the user to the real bank website, to
continue without any awareness that his username
and password have been taken over by the hackers.
 Domain-Flux
A botnet generates an enormous number of short
life domain names using Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), sending them one after another to
Control & Command (C&C) servers, depending on
DNS queries to locate one of them. When attackers
allocate a C&C server, they open a secret tunnel to
control a botnet through it Torabi et al. [2]. To
block and detect these malicious domain names,
the covert tunnels between the attacker and the
C&C server must be detected before any successful
malicious activity occurs Khare et al. [36].
C. Deep Learning (DL) Techniques
DL neural network is an advanced form of ML that
uses hierarchical data representation. Features in the
higher level, having more abstractions, are extracted
from the lower level, using various activation functions
Rusk [11]. The complicity of the hierarchical structure
of the DL models can improve the performance of
classification and regression problems by increasing
the achieved accuracy and reducing error rates Kamilaris and Prenafeta-Boldú [37]. DL neural networks
(CNN and RNN) have delivered an artificial revolution
in a wide range of applications, such as self-driving
vehicles, voice/image recognition, and traffic prediction, etc. Rusk [11].
Supervised DL model manipulates large labeled
datasets, just like the dataset of this study is labeled with
benign or malicious DoH queries (y). At each time point
in the training phase, a training set of features (X1 ;X2 ;X3 ;
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X4 ; :::; Xn ) is presented to the DL model with initial
weights (W1 ; W2 ; W3 ; W4 ; ::::; Wn ). In a hidden layer,
predictions (^y) are produced by activation functions. The
error rate between the actual (y) and the predicted (^y)
values is then calculated to adjust the weights, until the
error rate reaches the minimal, as shown in Fig. 2. After
the training phase, the model performance is evaluated,
to determine its ability to output a reasonable prediction
for new inputs Lecun [22].
D. Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)

Fig. 3. Forward RNN model.

RNN, one of the models that demonstrated proficiency in DL neural networks,
depends on the input



t
1
tþ
1
ðtÞ
sequence connection
x
;x ;x
Zhong et al. [38]. The hidden layer in the RNN
 consists

of sequential activation function nodes h t 1 ;
hðtÞ ; h tþ 1


. The sequence goes in forward or

backward propagation operations, whereby the input
for the next h depends on the output of the previous h.
In other words, the output of the previous h participates
in the production
of the next h during a
 of the output


Zhong
time series
O t 1 ; OðtÞ ; O tþ 1
et al. [38], as shown in Fig. 3.
Despite the stability of RNN models, they suffer
from limitations in keeping long input sequences during elongated time series situations. This problem is
called “vanishing or exploding gradients” Sherstinsky
[12].
Long Short-Term Memory RNN (LSTM) models
are designed to avoid the vanishing gradients problem
Al-Emadi et al. [39]. With long time series, LSTM

Fig. 2. DL model architecture.

Fig. 4. Inside LSTM cell.

cells are employed in the RNN nodes to learn the long
sequential connections of Meng et al. [40]. Besides the
activation function, each LSTM cell has three gates
Sherstinsky [12]:
1. Input gate (it ) determines which Xi from the previous cell will remain in the long-term memory.

Fig. 5. BRNN architecture.
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Equations (1) and (2) calculate the input gate and
the cell state, respectively.
2. Forget gate (ft): determines which Xt from the
previous cell will be forgotten from the long-term
memory. Equations (3) and (4) calculate the forget
gate and the cell state, respectively.
3. Output gate (ot): determines which outputs will be
passed to the next LSTM cell. Equations (5) and
(6) calculate the output gate and the vector of the
hidden sequence, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the LSTM cell in each RNN node.
it ¼ sðwi :½ht1 ; Xt  þ bi Þ

ð1Þ

Ct ¼ tanhðwc :½ht1 ; Xt  þ bc Þ

ft ¼ s wf :½ht1 ; Xt  þ bf

ð2Þ
ð3Þ

Ct ¼ ft :Ct1 þ it :Ct

ð4Þ

Ot ¼ sðWo :½ht1 ; Xt  þ bo Þ

ð5Þ

ht ¼ Ot :tanhðCt Þ

ð6Þ

 are the memory new state, and ht is
where b is bias, Ct, C
the sequence of hidden vectors.
E. Bi-Directional RNN (BRNN)
BRNN models employ two layers of LSTM cells in
a hidden layer, to be able to process the sequential
input in forward and backward directions. This reinforces the BRNN to build its predictions)in a Bidirectional way Kwon et al. [24]. In Fig. 5, (ht ) is the
!
backward output sequence, (ht ) is the forward output
sequence,
output Y is calculated by combining
) and the
!
both (ht ) and (ht ) as in equation (7).
) !
Y ¼ s ht ; h t
ð7Þ
where s is concatenation, multiplication, sum, or
average.
4. CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 dataset
DNS protocols have several vulnerabilities that have
been continuously exploited. DNS misuses have always attracted researchers looking for the best protection methods to preserve the privacy of DNS queries
across the network. HTTPS protocol encrypts DNS
queries and associates a secret tunnel for their transmission between the client and the DNS server, to

protect them from potential security attacks and protect
users’ privacy. It is impossible for firewalls to discover
these tunnels, but attackers can utilize them to send
many malicious DNS queries in the same connection,
reducing the potentiality to detect them MontazeriShatoori et al. [14].
CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 dataset was created
due to the importance of the dataset quality to enhance
the performance of ML techniques MontazeriShatoori
et al. [14]. It was subsequently verified by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC). CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 analyzes DoH traffic within
an application to distinguish benign from malicious
DoH queries Banadaki [41]. In this study, after the
network traffic was generated, all its packets were
filtered and aggregated to get rid of the impurities and
to represent the collected data succinctly.
Fig. 6 illustrates the process used to capture simulated network traffic, in which:
 10,000 Alexa websites were accessed to generate
HTTPS (non-DoH-related) traffic.
 Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome web browsers
were used for benign DoH traffic.
 DNS tunneling tools were utilized to generate
malicious DoH traffic, creating covert tunnels to
send encapsulated DNS queries using encrypted
HTTPS requests to DoH servers Banadaki [41].
Two-layer systematic approach was implemented to
capture malicious and benign network DoH traffic. At
layer one the traffic was classified into DoH-related
traffic and non-DoH-related traffic, using statistical
features. At layer two, the collected data was used to
train time-series classifier to label DoH-related traffic
into benign and malicious DoH, as shown in Fig. 6.
Table 1 shows more detailed information about the
data capturing process.
Python programmer defined tools were created for
the following purposes:
 “DoH Data Collector” tool was used to capture the
HTTPS traffic.
 “DoHLyzer” tool was used to read pcap files
(network packets), and to generate and then
analyze the flow of DoH-related traffic.
 “DoHMeter” tool was used to produce the output
csv file with labelled data, by extracting 28 features
(statistical and time-series) from pcap files on the
flow level, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sample of features.
Description of features

Fig. 6. The proposed two layer approach.

5. Methodology
This section demonstrates the implemented methodology (shown in Fig. 7) to build the proposed
BRNN-IDS model, which distinguishes between
benign and malicious DoH queries, using Python 3
programming utilities and libraries (Skilearn, Pandas,
Keras, etc.).
A. Data Selection Phase
Extracting the statistical features on the network
flow level, CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 Dataset's
pcap files were used. 34 features were collected in
csv files, to be used by the ML learning classifiers. In
this implemented methodology, only statistical features were used, therefore the six non-statistical features were excluded. Table 2 shows a sample of
features.

# of FBSa
Rate of FBS
# of FBRa
Rate of FBR
Mnb pkt len
Mdnb pKt len
Mdb pkt len
Variance of pkt len
STDb of pkt len
Coefficient of pkt len
Skew of Mdn pkt len
Skew of Md pkt len
Mn pkt time
Mdn pkt time
Md pkt time
Variance of pkt time
STD pkt time
Coefficient of pkt time
Skew of Mdn pkt time
Skew of Md pkt time
Mn Req/Res time
Mdn Req/Res time
Md Req/Res time
Variance of Req/Res time
STD of Req/Res time
Coefficient of Req/Res time
Skew of Mdn Req/Res time
Skew of Md Req/Res time

F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8
F9
F10
F11
F12
F13
F14
F15
F16
F17
F18
F19
F20
F21
F22
F23
F24
F25
F26
F27
F28

STD: Standard deviation.
a
FBS: Flow bytes sent eFBR: Flow bytes received.
b
Mn: Mean, Mdn: Median, Md: Mode.

1. Deleting All Redundant Values and Treating
Missing Values.
This is to reduce the computational overhead
and the training time; null or missing values could
be replaced with the median of other corresponding values or zero, or easily be deleted with their
entire row. In this methodology the redundant and
the missing values were deleted.
2. Normalizing
All the values were normalized within a specific

B. Data Pre-processing Phase
Choosing the best statistical features to improve the
performance of the classifier is not sufficient if the
dataset is not properly prepared. In this phase, the
dataset was pre-processed by:
Table 1
Data capturing process.
SERVERS/

AD Guard
Packets

Cloudflare
Flows

HTTPS (DNS-unrelated-Benign DNS queries)
Google Chrome
5609 K
105,141
Mozilla Firefox
4943 K
50,485
Malicious DNS queries
DNS to TCP
128 K
5459
DNSCAT2
1301 K
5369
LODINE
3938 K
11,336

Google DNS

Quad9

Packets

Flows

Packets

Flows

Packets

Flows

6117 K
4299 K

132,552
90,260

58,578 K
6413 K

108,680
138,422

10,737 K
4956 K

199,090
92,670

3694 K
12,346 K
5932 K

6045
9230
14,110

28,711 K
48,069 K
73,459 K

17,423
11,915
12,192

8750 K
9309 K
22,668 K

138,588
9108
8975
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sigmoid activation function for the last output layer.
The architecture was implemented using Keras v2.2.4
and TensorFlow.
D. Testing and Evaluation Phase

Fig. 7. The proposed methodology.

For evaluation, the BRNN training and testing
phases were compared in terms of their performance
accuracy and error rates, as shown in Figs. 9 and 10.
The error rate between them was undetected, and the
performance of the BRNN model displayed a rapid
improvement after a few iterations of training. The
accuracy of both training and testing phases was
completely achieved.

range, to improve the classification algorithms'
calculations and to avoid any overflow due to
particularly high- or low-ranging (non-normal)
values Al-Fawa'reh and Al-Fayoumiy [15].
3. Data Labeling
All the values of benign and malicious DNS
queries in the label column were represented by
0 and 1 values, respectively.
4. Splitting
The data set was split: 80% to the training set,
and 20% to the testing set.
C. BRNN Classification Phase
The BRNN model is built so as to concatenate the
output of bi-directional LSTM layers. The Sigmoid
function (s) shown in equation (8) was selected to be
the output activation function, which indicates the final
prediction (^
y):
1
sðxÞ ¼
ð8Þ
1 þ ex
The BRRN model is used in two phases:
1. The BRNN training phase, in which the BRNN
model learns how to identify benign and malicious
DoH queries patterns, utilizing the sequence of
statistical features in the 80% training set.
2. The BRNN testing phase, in which the BRNN
model is fed with new inputs from the 20% testing
set, to test its generalization ability.
As demonstrated in Fig. 8 the selected BRNN
consists of three layers of hidden units, made up of 64
units for the first hidden layer and 128 for the second
and third hidden layers. The activation function on the
first layer is tanh, where ReLU in the second layer, and

Fig. 8. BRRN model.
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Fig. 9. BRNN model accuracy rate.

The achieved accuracy rate for the BRNN model was
100%. In comparison with previous studies (as shown in
Table 3), the proposed BRNN model can distinguish
between benign and malicious DoH queries more efficiently, without any FP and FN rates. In conclusion, the
proposed BRNN model is adequate to build DoH IDS that
organizations can rely on to protect their environment.

As shown in Table 3, most ML studies used old
datasets to test their work, whereas only two recent
studies have used realistic network traffic to test their
systems. Experiments have shown that our model
achieves the state of arts using only statistical
features.

Fig. 10. BRNN model error rate.

278

C. Yaiprasert / Karbala International Journal of Modern Science 7 (2021) 268e280

Table 3
The achieved accuracy.
Study

Jafar et al. [5]
Almashhadani et al. [16]
Nguyen et al. [17]
Al Messabi et al. [19]
Alsaadi et al. [20]
Damodaram [21]
Fawcett [23]
Yuan et al. [25]
Bouzar-Benlabiod et al. [26]
Banadaki [41]
This Model

Feature extraction algorithm
✓



✓
✓



✓


6. Conclusions
DNS abuse is one of the most difficult threats
cybersecurity experts seek to combat. However, since
many DNS tunneling tools are available online and do
not require a high level of skill to use, businesses must
be aware of this potential security violation. This paper
proposes an IDS model to detect malicious DoH
queries among the network's covert tunnels using statistical analysis and DL techniques by applying a bidirectional recurrent neural network model. Comparing
the achieved accuracy and error rates with previous
studies, the proposed IDS model can distinguish between benign and malicious DoH queries more efficiently. This model can be used to detect any malicious
DNS queries or DNS tunneling type in the real world.
One of the most important concerns to consider is the
size of the dataset, since the most innovative DL has a
large dataset. The overall conclusion is that combining
the CIRAeCICeDoHBrw-2020 dataset with DL
techniques is a highly effective method for detecting
DNS tunneling, with a distinct impact on internet
security.
The only limitation or constraint that was experienced was the size of the dataset, since the state-of-theart DL has a large dataset. In future work, advanced
methods will be applied for hyperparameter optimization and feature selection, such as Monarch Butterfly
Optimization (MBO), Earthworm Optimization Algorithm (EWA), Elephant Herding Optimization (EHO),
Moth Search (MS) algorithm, Slime Mold Algorithm
(SMA), and Harris's Hawk's Optimization (HHO).
Furthermore, distributed IDS deployment using
different ML and DL methods will be implemented on
a real network, to enhance the design and increase its

Classification algorithms

Highest achieved accuracy

ML

DL

RF, SVM, DT, K-NN
DT, SVM, NB, K-NN
DBSC, K-NN
DT
K-NN, SVM and NB
RF



LGBM and XG Boost








CNN, SV
BRNN
LSTM-RNN

BRNN

99.9%
98%
100%
77.52%
99.53%
94.71%
96%
98.410%
98.85%
100%
100%

throughput and performance, and to strengthen effort
to prevent malicious DoH queries within organizational networks.
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